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1. Introduction
This paper addresses the relation between commodity trade and
international factor mobility in general terms. There are two rtivations.
The first is the intrinsic importance of the subject relative to the limited
attention it has thus far received. MuJ.ti—commodity and imilti—factor
generalizations of the standard factor proportions theory of international
trade deal rstly with goods trade only and ignore international nobility of
factors of production (see Ethier (1982b) for a recent survey). Although
there exists an extensive literature on various aspects of international
factor nobility (surveyed in Jones and Neary (1982)), there are few attempts
systematically to discuss the trade pattern in both goods and factors when
some factors are traded. Such a discussion is contained in Svensson (1982),
who extends previous work by Dixit and Woodland (1982) to trade in factors as
well as in goods. But Svensson's analysis deals only with marginal factor
endowment differences in the neighborhood of an autarky equilibrium. Thus a
more general treatment is needed.
Our second notivation is the dixnensionality issue. As is well
known, the standard theorems of factor—endowments trade theory are very
sensitive to whether the nwnber of goods equals the number of factors or
not.1 This is widely regarded as very damaging to the theory, since the—2—
relative abundance ofgoodsand factors is an arbitrary feature of nature and
technolor,and one about which most of' us have limited intuition. Ethier
(1982b) presents a countervailing argument assigning factor mobility a key
role. There are two parts to the argument.(i) Those traditional results
whichare otherwise quite general, with equal numbers of'goods and factors,
are weakened only slightly when goods outnumber factors but substantially
when factors outnumber goods. Thus the key requirement is that there be at
least as xxariy goods as factors, not that they be precisely equal in number.
(ii) The n.in reason dimensionality natters is not the technological distinc—
tion between goods and factors, but the assumption that the former are inter-
nationally traded while the latter are not. Thus the standardresults are
preservedwhen factors outnumber goods if enough factors are traded. This
interpretation leaves the basic propositions sensitive nainly not to an
arbitrary feature of nature but to whether enough narkets exist ——towhich
most substantive results in economics are sensitive. In any event, this
discussion implies a central role for factor mobility in an understanding of
the significance of the basic propositions of factor endowments trade theory.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic
framework, and then Section3offers a full treatment of' factor—price
equalization,2 exposing the role of dimensionality. Section 4derivessome
Rybczynski—type and Stolper—Sainuelson type results. The relation of com-
modity trade and factor trade to each other and to factor endowments is the
topic of the Heckscher—Ohlin type results of Section 5, which thereby also
extend the previous analysis in Svenssori (1982) of narginal factor endowment
differences. Section 6 contains a sumnary and some conclusions.—3—
2.International Equilibrium
Consider aworld of two countries, home and foreign. First we
describe the home country. There are M goods, indexed i=l,...,M, allofwhich
are traded. They are produced by N factors, NT of which are traded and NN c
whicharenot. Factor endowments are fixed.
There are J (production) sectors, indexed j =l,...,J.Ehch
production sector is characterized by a convex technology T' of feasible
combinations (ii, v3) of net output M—vectors y of goods and non—negative
input N—vectors v of factors. In particular, there are no externalities
between sectors. (Indeed, sectors are defined as the finest partition of the
overall production technology for which there are no intersectoral
externalities.)
By using this concept of sectors, we can include joint production.3
For the special case of no joint production, we can identify sectors with
goods, and for sector j all (yi, v) in T will have y 0, and y =Ufor
all goods i other than J•
For given goods prices p and factor inputs v, the sector j product
function is defined as G(p,v) =uRx{py:(y,v3)cT3} ,theriaximum value
j ij
added obtainable, where py denotes the inner product z.p y. (or,
equivalently, the natrix product between the row vector p' and the column
vectoryi; we let all vectors without a prime be column vectors, and let
prime denote transpose). For a given domestic factor input v, the
domestic product function is defined as G(p,v) =nax{E.G(p,v):Ev
<v},
thenaximum value ofdomesticoutput when factors are freely nxbile between_4—
sectors. We let v =(k,P/ )denote home factor endowments, where the
NT_vector k denotes ownership oftraded factors and the Nw_vector 2. denotes
endowments of nontraded factors. For simplicity we shall call these
"capital"and "labor", respectively-. Let the NT_vector k denote capital
input in production (as distinct from capital endowments) in the home
country-,and let the NT_vector r denote rentals, the price of capital.Then,
forgiven goods prices and rentals, and given factor endowments, we define
the national product function G(p,r,v) as
Ci) G(p,r,k,L)=G(p,k(p,r,L),&)+r(k k(p,r,L)).
Here the capital input function i(p,r,L) is the solution to flEX {G(p,,L) +
r' (k —k):k )O},whichthen fulfi11s
(2) Gk(p,k(p,r,2.),L) = r.
Hence we assume each sector behaves competitively, and takes goods
prices and rentals as given. The first term on the right hand side ofCi)
is domestic product from the use of factors (k,2.) at home, and the second
term is factor income from abroad, due to the net export of capital (k —
thedifference between endowments and domestic input of capital.
Assume that the demand side of the home country can be represented
by a standard M—vector demand function D(p,Y), where Y is national income.
We define net export of goods, x, and of capital, z, as
(3) xy—candzk—k,
the difference between output y and consumption CM—vector) c, and between capital—5—
endowments and capital input. By standard properties of the national product
function, net export of goods and capital will be given by thefunctions5
R) x(p,r,v) =G(p,r,v)—D(p,G(p,r,v)),and
(5) z(p,r,v)=G,r,V)=k—k(p,r,).
Furthermore, the prices of nontraded factors, wages w, will be given by
(6) w=
G2(p,r,v).
Theforeign country has factorendowmentsv =(ç*,*) and
analogousnational product and dennd functions, which give rise to net
export functions for goods and capital, denoted by x*(p,r,v*) and z*(p,r,v*).
A world equilibrium will satisfy
CT) x(p,r,v) +x*(p,r,v*)=0,and
(8) zCp,r,v)+z*(p,r,v*)=0,
that is, both goods and traded—factor nm.rkets are in equilibrium.
3. Factor Price Equalization
We first determine when free trade in goods and capital will
internationally equalize the rewards of nontraded factors. To this end we
now assume that the two countries have identicaltechnology with constant
returnsto scale. Then G(p,r,v) is linearly homogeneous in v, k(p,r,9..) Is
linearly homogeneous in 2, and the functions apply to both countries.—6—
To establish a point of reference, suppose initially thatthe
world's stock of factors is distributed between the two countries so as to
render the foreign endowment proportional to the home: v =Xv.Thus the
twocountriesare initially identical in all respects save possibly tastes
andscale.
Under these circumstances, a possible free—trade equilibrium, (7)
and (8), is obtained if each country produces a scaled—down version of the
world output vector, if no capital is actually traded, and if goods are
traded to accommodate taste differences. (Depending upon dimensionality,
there nay be other equilibria as well, with the same prices, but this
possibility will not disturb our subsequent argument. We assume that the
equilibriumprice vector is unique, up to a irultiplicative factor.) That is,
wehave
(9) x+x*0 and zz*0.
Also, w =G(p,r,v)=(p,r,xv)=w,so that the prices of nontraded
factors are equalized. We wish to know the circumstances under which this
equalization is preserved when we abandon the assumption that endowments in
the two countries are strictly proportionalto each other.
As a first step, let the relative endowments depart irarginally from
proportionalityby perturbing the above equilibrium by redistributing
endowments:6
(10) dv +dv*=0,with Wdv =Wdv*=0,—7—
where W =(r,w ).Then,from (7)and(8)
(ii) (x +x*)dp+(x + x*)dr=—(x —x*)dv=0and
p p r r v v
(12) (z +z*)dp+(Zr + z*)dr=—(z—z*)dv=0,
as consequences of homogeneity. Here x is the MxMiratrix etc.
Then dp =0and dr =0is consistent with maintaining free trade equilibrium.






where we have used =0;that is, wages do not directly depend on capital
endowments.7 Now, since the national product function is linearly homogeneous
in factor endowments, its first derivatives are of zero homogeneity, and its







andwe see that wages remain equalized if is equal to zero; that is, if
changes in labor endowments have no (local) effect, at constant goods prices
and rentals, on wages.—8—
Toshow that indeedequals zero, under the assumptions of
identical technologies, constant returns to scale, and initially proportional
endowments, we employ the unit value added cost function, as follows.
For each sector j, the unit value added cost function c(p,w) is
defined as8
(16) C(p,W)=ndn{Wv:pyi1, (y,v)cT}.
This cost function gives, for given goods prices (the M—vector p) and factor
prices (the N—vector w), the minimum value of inputs for which value added,
the value of the net .output vector, is equal to unity. Let denote value
added in sector j; let Y =(yi)be the corresponding J—vector; and let
C(p,W), the national cost function, be the vector whose components are the
cost functions for the sectors with positive value added. That is,9 let
J(Y) ={j:jcJ, >O}(the set of sectors with positive value added) and
C(p,W) = (We suppress the argument Y, or J(Y), of the
national cost function.) The national cost function is homogeneous of degree
zero in goods prices and factor prices. Then, by Euler's theorem
(ii) pC +WC 0,
p W
where pC denotes pre—multiplication of the (row) M—vector p by the
(Mx J(Y))—uatrix C =[aCu/aph],etc. Since W =(r,w)and in equilibrium
w, we can write
(18) =—pC
—rC £ w p r
We note that the xatrix C EaCI3w'] isNx J(Y). If J(Y) N ,
w N N—9—
Cis square or can be ude so by arbitrary deletion of enough equations
(that is, sectors) from (18).Ifso, and if C thus modified is of rank N
w N
it is invertible, and we can write
(19) =—(pC+YC)c'.
P. prw
10 Here the right hand side does not depend on labor input P.. We hence
conclude that equals zero, and from (15)wehave factor price
equalization, and
(20) dw =dw* 0.
Thesufficient condition for this is
(21) J(Y) >N=rankC
N w
thatis, there must be as nny linearly independent (that is, distinct)
sectors with positive value added as there are non—traded factors. If the
equilibrium vector Y of value added is unique, (21) holds with equality and the
number of sectors is e.ctly equal to the number of non—traded factors.
The next step is to consider large international differences in
relative endowments. The above argument appliesto all finite changes Av and
tv* consistent with (10), for which neither country is forcedto shut down
any sector.'1 Whenwill this be so?
To see this, first recall that the price derivatives ofthecost
function,in equilibrium, are conditional unit value added input functions.'2
Then we can write the home country's output, capital input and labor input as—10—
(22) y =— CY,k =CYand£ =CY,
where CY denotes post—multiplication of the nRtrix C =I3C/p]by the
(column)vector Y, etc. Let us now define the generalized diversification cone
K(p,r,w) as
(23) K(p,r,w) = 0: £ =CY, o}.
It is, for given goods and factor prices, the set of labor inputs consistent
withnon—negative value added in all sectors. The diversification cone is of
dimension NN if (21) holds. To assure that theoutput vector is unique, we
assume that(21)holds with equality. Then Cw is square and can be inverted,
and we can use (22) to get
(21) pw rw
Now, suppose the world is in the initial equilibrium, and consider
changes v and v* consistent with (10), and leaving £ and R. in the
diversification cone. Is this consistent with a new equilibrium with






+j*)A[CC1(Z +L*)] =CC'(AL+AZ*) =0.
Thus world output of goods and world input of capital reu.in unchanged.
Since world denRnd for goods and world endowments of capital are unchanged,—11—
world markets for goods and capital remain in equilibrium.
It follows that for changes v and t,v* that fulfill (10) and leave
£and 9.*in the diversification cone, there exists a new equilibrium with
unchangedgoods andfactor prices and hence factor price equalization. But
are we sure that theredo not still exist other equilibria, where factor
priceequalization does not obtain? To dispose of this possibility, assume
0 1 1 0 there exist vage vectors w and w ,withw w,andlet 9. be in both
K(p,r,w0) and K(p,r,w). Then there exist Y° andY1 such that
(26) 9. =C0Y0and 2. =C1Y1,
0 1 0 1 whereCandCw denote C(p,r,w )andC(p,r,w ).Furthermore,by zero
hongeneity of the national cost function, we have
(27) —pC0 =rC0+w0C1and —pC1 =r'C1+
p r w p r w
with obvious notation.
Recalling that the derivatives are conditional input demands, since
the input demands minimize cost, we also have
(28) rC° +w1C°—p'C0 =rC0+w0C0, r w pr
1 010 00 with at least one inequality strict if ww •Thusw 'C >wC,so
1 000 1 0 (29) (w —w)CY =(w—w)'? 0,
with strict inequality if w1w0.Bya symmetric argument, we can show
(30) (w° —w1)L0,
0 1 1 0 with strict inequality if ww •Itfollows that w =w,contraryto what-.12—
was assumed at first.
Hence, factor price equalization must obtain, if the endowment
changes fulfill (10) and leave both countries' labor endowments in the
diversification cone. The crucial condition is (21). If there is no joint




Thatis, the total number of international narkets (goods and traded factors)
must be at least as great as the number of factors. This indicates that at
bottom factor price equalization depends not on an arbitrary aspect of nature
(the relative numbers of goods and factors) but rather, just like nDst
interesting propositions in economics, on the existence of enough nurkets.
Note,however, thatthe number of narkets which is sufficientdepends upon
the number of factors (so that reducing the number of goods and increasing
thenumber of traded factors a like aimount is not neutral: the required
number of'internationalnarkets rises).
At this point we mist sayaword about nontraded goods. They
shouldof course be allowed if commodities are to be treated analogously to
factors. We exclude them for expositional reasons, since they do not affect
our basic argument. If included, conditions for equilibrium in nontraded
goods narkets would be solved for nontraded goods prices as functions of the
present state variables, and these functions would simply be embodied in the
form of the nationalproduct functions, and so forth. Then, provided proper
carewere taken in the use of the diversification—cone concept, the argument—13—
ofthis section would proceed essentially unchanged.'3 In particular, (21)
would ren.in the key dimensionality condition. Note thatthisindicates a
wayin which factors and goods differ: an additional nontraded factor xrakes
(21) more stringent, but an additional nontraded good does not.
4.ComparativeStatics
In factor—endowments modelsofcommodity trade, the Rybczynski
theorem describes the effects of endowment changes on outputs, and the
Stolper—Samuelson theorem addresses the implications of commodity—price
changes for factor rewards.' Both propositions exploit the technological
relation between goods and factors and do not depend upon whether factors
areinternationally traded or not (although the latter might help determine
the circumstances under whichthe theorems can in fact be applied). For
example,the Rybczynski theorem's descriptionof how commodity outputs
respondto changes in a nation's employment of factors is not sensitive to
whether the latter changes are due to domestic factor accumulation or to the
import of traded factors. Thus we need say little about the influence of
factor trade on the standard propositions. Instead we focus on the new
questionsthat arise.
There are three relevant aspects to the two theorems. First, they
are linked together by the "reciprocity relations." Next, each of the
theorems contains two assertions, one relating to nagnitudes and one relating
to directions. For example, the Stolper—Samuelson theorem asserts that
commodity price changes produce unambiguous changes in real factor rewards,—l 4—
andalso thatrelativefactor intensities help to predict the direction of
the latter. We examine in turn each of the three aspects.
(i)The reciprocity relations
The standard reciprocity relations follow from differentiation of
the domestic product function. We have G=G,where again a prime denotes
transpose. Hence, for good i and factor j,
(32) ayh/vi =(/av)(aG/p')(3/p1)(aG/avi) =
Theserelations hold whenever the respective terms are well defined. They
reflect only the technology (and the optimization implicitin the domestic
productfunction) and these hold regardless of whether factor j is traded or
nontraded. But the presence of traded factors introduces the questions
of how changes in the endowments of nontraded factors influence a country's
use of traded factors, and of how changes in the (international) price of
traded factors affect the rewards of nontraded factors. We therefore derive
an appropriate set of reciprocity relations. This is not difficult. For we
have, using twicedifferentiability of the national product function,
=-, r&Lr
andsince, by (5) and (6),
(33) and—k =G
r £r £ rP.
we get the desired reciprocity relation
() = i/a1
for traded factor i and nontraded factor j.—15--
(ii)lhgnitudes
It is well known thatthefollowing results hold under verygeneral
circumstanceswhen M =Nand there is no joint production: (a) an increase
in the price of anygoodcauses a nDre—than—proportional rise in some factor
reward and a decline in some other factor reward; (b) at given commodity
prices, an increase in the econonr_wide use of anyfactorrequires a
more—than--proportional rise in the output of some good and an absolute fall
in the output of some other good; (c) application of the reciprocity
relations(32)to the "Stolper—Samuelson" result (a) yieldsfurther
"Rybczynski" results and application to the "Rybczynski" result (b) yields
further "Stolper—Samuelson" results. If there are nrre goods than factors
these results are almost completely preserved, but they are weakened
substantiallywhen the number of factors exceeds the number of goods.15
The presence of traded factors haslittleeffect on these
propositions: the results follow whenever the conditions are met- Buttwo
points should be rrade.First, the above results are weakened when there are
more factors than goods because endowment changes at constant prices then
require changes in factor rewards for factor nErkets to clear.Thusthe
analysisofthe previous section implies that, with traded factors, condition
(31) replaces M N as the dimensionality requirement for the results to hold
in fullstrength:there must be at least as iiany international nurkets as
factors.
The second point concerns the relation between traded and nontraded
factors. Suppose an exogenous rise in the reward of some traded factor, all—16—
other international prices renining fixed. Then some factor reward must
fall,else no sector would be able to earn non—negative profits at unchanged
commodity prices. With the rewards of traded factors fixed, it must be a
nontradedfactor that becomes cheaper. Furthermore, this is a. real decline
since commodity prices have not changed. Thus each traded factor is an
"enemy-'t to some nontraded factor. The reciprocity relations (35)thenimply
that the denRnd for any traded factor is reduced by a rise in the endowment
of some single nontraded factor. Note that these results do not require
condition(31)and that they are fully compatible with joint production.
(iii)Directions
Infactor—endowments tradeimodels, factor intensities predict, in
anaverage sense, the response of factor rewards to commodity—price changes
and the response of outputs to factor—endowment changes. For example,
commodity—price changes are positively correlated with changes in the rewards
of thosefactors used relatively most intensively (see Ethier (1982a,b)).
Such predictions are not sensitive to whether some factors are traded or
t.l6 But now we are interested instead inpredicting the direction of
change of commodity outputs and traded—factor usage jointly in response to
changes in the endowments of nontraded factors, and also in predicting
changes in nontraded factor rewards in response to changes in the vector of
commodity prices and traded—factor rewards. We have
=G(p,r,v)and = =
Defineq =(y,—iv)' and ii= (p,r )',whereall vectors without primes are—17—
columnvectors.Then we have
q= G(ir,k,i. it
Considerthe effects of an endowment change from to £1, at given
international prices it.Let =(1T,k,t),q0 =Gt,k,0)and
define the real—valued function
a(t) (q1 —
Bythe mean—value theorem there exists an £ on the line segment connecting £
and £1 such that
1 0 — 1 0
a(p..)— a(p..)= a(.)(t—£).
Substitutingthe definitions of these terms yields







1 0 1 —0 1 0
(36) [(y — y)-, (—ic+k)-]R(P.. —2. )> 0.
Thisis the general (directional) Rybczynski theorem for an economy with
traded factors. Note that R depends only upon technolor. Using the term
"relative factor intensities" to refer to the relative nugnitudes of the
elements of R, correlation (36)saysthat any change in the endowment of
nontraded factors will, at constant prices of goods and traded factors, tend
onaverageto raise the most the outputs of goods, and to reduce the most the—18—
usage of traded factors, that are relativeiy most intensive in the use of
those nontraded factors that haveincreased the most, etc. Note thatwe look
atthe various commodities' intensity of use of nontraded factors only, but
thattheseare compared not only with each other but also with the relative
intensities of nontraded factors in the econonr's usage of traded factors.
(Nontraded factors canbethought of as "employed" in the national usage f'
traded factors in thesense that,givencommodity outputs, an increased
endowment of nontraded factorsallows the econoxmj- to reduce its usage of
tradedfactors).17
This result is extremely general in that it allows joint
production, applies to arbitrary endowment changes, and is independent of the
relative numbers of goods, traded factors, and nontraded factors. Thus the
movement from to 9.1 may or may not change w. Butfor(36)tobe useful we
need to explore the nature of the keymatrixB. To this end assume that
there are the same number ofgoods as sectors. Then, ifthe matrix —C in
(22) is of full rank, it can be inverted. Doingso, (22) becomes
(37) k=—c C1y=—CC1Gand £ =—CC'y =—CC1G rp rp p wp wp p
To proceed further we need further restrictions. Assume that condition (31)
holds, so that our results from the previous section implythata small
deviationof £about 2.producesno change in w. Then from (37)
—k=—CC1G and I—C C1G £rp p2. wp p2.
whereI is the identity matrix. If, furthermore, (31) holds with equality,—19—








Here_ç'cissimply- the matrix of nontraded factor requirements (at the
intermediatepoint) in the respective sectors and —C Cr the matrixof traded
factorrequirements. If joint production is excluded, —C is the diagonal
matrix whose diagonals are the inverse of the goods prices and can hence be
made equal to the identity matrix by the proper choice of units of
measurement of goods.
Continuing to suppose that (31) holds —butnot necessarily- with
equality ——supposethat the hypothetical endowment change leaves the econorrr
withinthe original generalized diversification cone. Thus no change in w
will take place and the production techniques will likewise be unaltered. In
this case H can sily be calculated from the observed techniques.
Note also that (31)now,under theassumption ofno change in w, gives
(38a) Ct' —£°)I_CwC;'](Y'
—y0)=(1—t)(t — > 0and
—1 —0 1 1 0 —1 -.0 -.10
(38b) (k —k)[—Crc;
](y —y)(k—k)(k —k) >0.
That is,the direct input requirements are in this case used to determine
relative factor intensities.
We also show a Stolper—Samuelson analogue to (36).Considerthe—20—
effect onnontradedfactor prices w of a change from goods and traded factor
0 0 0 1 1 1 — pricesit=(p,r ') to it=(p',r ). Starting from w(it,v) =GR(p,r,v),
let
=1(1T1,v) and w0 =r(°,v), and define b(it) =(w'—w0)(w,v). By the
mean—value theorem, there exist a it on the line segment between it0 and it' such
that
b(1)—b(it0)=b(_)(l —0)
Substituting the definitions of these terms, we have the desired analogue to (36),
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
(39) (w —w) (w —w) =Cv—w)#S(it —it) > 0,
where
S =
5. Patternsof Trade in Goods and Factors
Inthis sectionwe develop versions, appropriate in the presence of
factortrade, of the principleof comparative advantage and of the price and
quantityversions of the Heckscher—Ohlin theorem.
Ci) The principleofcomparative advantage
General results relating the pattern of trade in goods only to
differencesinautarky goods prices have been obtained by Deardorff (1980) and
Dixit and Norn.n (1980), and surveyedinEthier (1982b).Factor trade canbe
straightforwardlyincorporated. Letting and rA denote autarky prices and c,
y and z denote free—trade consumption, output and factor exports, we have
A AA A A
p c G(p ,r ,v) > p y + r z.—21—
The first inequality follows from standard gains—from—trade arguments, which
easily encompass factor trade,18 and the second inequality follows from the
definition of G. Thus
A
it(x,z) 0
where =A_,rA_ )andx =y—c.Now ir (x ,z )= 0if r denotes free
trade prices. Thus
(ho) — (f ,z ).0.
Similar arguments applied to the foreign country yield
)(x*,z*)' 0.
Since (x,z) +(x*,z*)=0,we have
1) (.rr —v(,z)—> o.
Thegreat generality of our results (ho)and(hl) should be apparent.
(ii) The price version of the Heckscher—Ohlin theorem
Assume that the number of goods equals the number of sectors and that
C is of full rank so that(17)implies
=r[—cTh1]+[— l}• rp wp
Furthernre, assume no joint production. Then the right—hand side above
depends on factor prices only and indeed the right—hand side is identical to





1 —cc_ 0 VP
Nowdefine the real—valued function d(W) by
d(W)=
where(x ,z') denotes the actual free—trade vector of net exports of goods and
A factors.Let Wand W denote autarky factor prices at home and abroad. Then,
— A A* -
forsome W between W and W
or
d(WA) -d(WA)=(WA - WA*)*c
(12) (A — (x',z') =(WA — WA*).D()(x,,z).
Here we have used d(W) =D(W)(x',z),since by cost minimizing all terms
are zero. The left—hand side of (12) is nonpositive by
1),, \- 4. -C'.-,.4-l..-,...- -.1.-4- .L/O .jr
A A* -1 A A* -1 A A*
(143) Cr —r)[—CC ]x + (w —w)[—CC lx +Cr —r)z0, rp wp
where we recall thatthedirect capital input and labor input nRtrices
—cc1 and—cc' areevaluated at W. The inequality (143) isa weak result, rp wp
A A* relativeto the goal ofpredicting something about (x,z) solely from (w —w).
Nowwe need to know (rA —rA)aswell, that is, we do not use a concept of
relative factor abundance limited to nontraded factors only. The problem is
thatthe latter do not ingeneral give enough inforxtion ifthere are also
traded factors.-23—
(iii)The quantity version of the Heckscher—Ohlin theorem
In factor—endowments trade theory, the quantity version of the
Heckscher—Ohljn theorem is related to the Rybczynski theorem. We now wish to
use our versions of the latter to develop explanations of the pattern of
joint trade in goods and factors. To thatend,we nowdefinethe vector x
andx' of homecountry "preference trade" and "induced trade", respectively,
as follows
P 1 I P x=g(y +*)—candx =x—x
wherec denotes the home consumption vector, g the home—country share of the
value of world output, and y' and y denote home and foreign outputs
respectively. Note that if the home and foreign countries share identical
honiothetic tastes, x 0 and x =x'.Define =g(1+t*),where and P'
denote endowments of nontraded factors at home and abroad. Then, if p and r
equalfree trade equilibrium prices, wehave from (36)
1 0 ..1 .0 1 0
E(y
—y),(—Ic+k)')R(. —£)>0
wherey =G(p,r,k,p.1) =G(p,k,)and k1 =k(p,r,)for i =0,1.Nov
—jO=i(p,r,L1)
—(p,r,g(p.+
= [1—ki+1k—g(I+ = —z+
Herez denotes the vector of home country capital exports and denotes the
vector each component of which shows the excess of home ownership of the
respective traded factor above the fraction g of the world supply. Letbe—2k—
defined by
I E (11 z z —z
Al so
—y0=G(p,1,L1) —G(p,0,0) =y'—gIG(p,1,L') +G(p,*4*)J
1 1 P I =(y—c)+c—g(y+ = x—x=x
Thuswe have
R5) (x,z)R[(t' —g(&1+ > 0.
This is the generalized quantity version of the Heckscher—Ohlin theorem. It
saysthat the induced net exports of goods and the z' portion of the net export
of capital are positively correlated with the country's relative abundance of
the nontraded factors utilized relatively intensively. Equation (1i5)decomposes
total factor trade z into what we call "endowment factor trade"and "induced
factor trade" z'. The endowment trade component is the direct result of the
extent to which the country's ownership of traded factors is not proportional to
theworld supply of thesefactors. This trade is independent of factor
intensities(and technolor generally), of tastes, of prices, and of endowments
of nontraded factors, except in the indirect sense that all these help to
determine the factor of proportionality g, which depends upon the actual
equilibrium.By contrast, induced factor trade z', which alone enters into
(145), is determined, jointly with induced commodity trade, by factor intensities
and by endowments of nontraded factors. Ownership of traded factors has no
influence (except, a.in, if ithelps determine the general equilibrium).—25—
Broadly speaking, countries conduct endowment trade directly to export abundant
tradedfactors and to import scarce traded factors, and they conduct induced
factor trade indirectly to export abundant nontraded factors and to import
scarce nontraded factors ——inthe form of those traded factors which best
substitutefor them inthe production process. Both components of total factor
trade thus have a factor—endowment base.
Note the analor between the two types of goods trade and the two
types of factor trade. Induced goods trade, like induced factor trade, is
determined by relative factor intensities as summarized in (145).Preference
(goods) trade reflects taste differences just as endowment (factor) trade
reflectsownership differences. Iftastes are identical and homothetic, and if
the home and foreign countries own traded factors in identical proportions, (145)
describesall trade. It is common to use the term "demand reversal" to describe
a situation where taste differences cause the opposite pattern of commodity
trade(in a 2x2 world) to that predicted on the basis of relative factor
endowments. We can analogously use the term "demand—endowment reversal" to
refer to the case where x' andare such that (x,z)R[L1 —g(p1+ < 0.
The basic result (145) allows joint production, is valid no matter
how great the difference between home and foreign endowments, requires no
restrictionson dimensionality, and imposes no additional restrictions on
technolor (such as ruling out higher dimensional analogs of factor—intensity
reversals). To proceed further, suppose thatthenumber of sectors equals
the number of goods, that there are at least as many goods and traded factors
as there are factors, and that in the free trade equilibrium the home and—26—
foreign endowments ofnoritradedfactors lie in a common generalized
diversificationcone (so thatthere is factor price equalization). If we now
applyto (38a) the same logic that we applied to (36) in order to derive (1t5)
we obtain
(146) —g(1+z*)I_ E_CWC; 1x1>0.
Thus a country will onaverage export those goods which make relatively
intensiveuse of the country's relatively abundant nontraded factors. (This of
course applies onlytoinduced trade. We describe as a "demand reversal" the
I
case where substitution of x for x in (146) reverses the direction of the
inequality.)
Note two aspects of this result. First, the concept of relative
factor intensity employed here is the most natural one: simplytherelative
sizes of the direct nontradedfactor input requirements of the techniques
actuallyinuse. Second, note thatonlythe endowments of nontraded factors,
and only thatpartof the input matrix pertaining to nontraded factors, enter
into (146). Changes in the ownership of traded factors, or technological
changes which do not influence the use of nontraded factors, will produce no
effect. That is, (146) establishes a sense in which the pattern of induced
commodity trade, on average, cannot be reversed by such changes, even ifthe
trade vector x' changes. But such a reversal could result from a change in the
traded status of a factor,19 since such a change would add or subtract from the
matrix in (146).—27—
Expression (16)canbe interpreted, in the custonRry way, assaying
that comnrdity trade substitutes for the exchange of nontraded factors. A
similar relation can, surprisingly, be established between (induced)goods trade
and actual (induced) factor trade. Using (38b) in thesame way that we have
used (38a) and (36)leadsto
('er)z'[—C clx<0. rp
This says that a country on average exports those goods that nakerelatively
intensive use of those factors that are imported in excess of endowment
trade. That is, induced trade in goods and the induced exchange of traded
factorsare, in a sense, substitutes.2° Note that, again, the relevant concept
of factor intensity is the relative size of the direct traded—factorinputs of
the techniques actually used. Also, the part of the technolorpertaining to
nontraded factors doesnot enter at all.
Indeed,under present assumptions, this basic substitution property
can be nEde xre exact. We first note thatthewell—known Travis—Vanek
theorem21extends to encompass factor trade in a straightforward way.
Induced goods trade would enable the home country to consume the fractiong of
theworld output of each good. Factor price equalization then implies that
these consumed goods would embodr the services of the fractiong of the worldTs
stock of each factor, traded or nontraded.Let x& —CCx' and xk—C Cx' wp rp
denote the nontraded—factorand traded—factor content of induced goods trade.
Then—28—
xt =1—g(+L*)and =(k1—z)—g(k1+
byour generalized Travis—Vanek theorem. Thus
k 1 1 E I x =k—g(k+k*)—z=z—z=—z
That is, induced factor trade is equal to and opposite in sign to the traded
factor content. of induced goods trade.
6. Summary and Conclusions
Factor price equalization for nontraded factors, with trade in goods
and some factors, results if the number of distinct sectors with positive value
added is at least as large as the number of nontraded factors and if each
country's endowment of nontraded factors is in the generalized diversification
cone. If there is no joint production, this requires the number of goods and
traded factors to be at least as large as the total number of factors, that is,
the number of international markets should be at least as large as the number of
factors. The introduction of nontraded goods does not change this result.
Factor price equalization does not per se depend on the (rather
arbitrary) relative number of goods and factors but instead on the (less
arbitrary) relative number of international markets and factors.
Nextwe examined the 1rbczynski and Stolper—Samuelson theorems. The
usualreciprocityrelations hold between the effect on output of factor input
variations(at constant goods prices) and the effect on factor prices of goods—29—
price variations (at constant factor input), independently of whether some
factors are traded or not. We also derived additional reciprocity relations,
between the effect on traded factor inputs of nontraded factor input variations
(at constant goods and traded factor prices) and the effect on nontraded factor
prices of 'variations in traded factor prices (at constant nontraded factor
input).
The "ngnitude" aspects of the Rybczynski and Stolper—Samuelson
theorems require the conditions for nontraded factor price equalization to hold
in full strength, that is, there should be at least as nny international
markets as factors.Even without nontraded—factor price equalization, each
traded factor is an "eneny" to some nontraded factor, in that the nontraded
factor's price niist fall if the traded factor's price increases. By the
reciprocity relations, the demand for any traded factor is reduced by the
endowment of some single nontraded factor.
We derived a general (directional) Ry-bczynski theorem: any change in
the endowment of nontraded factors will, at constant goods and traded factor
prices,tend on the average to raise the nest the output of those goods, and to
reduce the ixst the usage of those traded factors, thatuserelatively
intensively those nontraded factors which increase the most. Here, "relative
intensity"is defined from the sign pattern of the generalized Rybczynski nntrix
of the national product function. This result is extremely general in that it
allowsjoint production, applies to arbitrary endowment changes, and is
independent of the relative numbers of goods, traded factors, and nontraded
factors.—30—
If the conditions for factor price equalization hold, the above
theorem holds for relative intensity defined from the direct nontraded factor
inputcoefficients.
We also derived a (directional) Stolper—Samuelson theoremthat
a change in goods andtraded—factor prices on average increases the most the
pricesof those nontraded factors used relatively intensively by the goods and
traded factors whose prices increase the most.
Finally, we looked at patterns of trade in goods and factors. The
principle of comparative advantage extends in straightforward fashion to
encompass factor trade. The price version of the Heckscher—Ohlin theorem is,
however,ratherweak.The quantity version fares better. Decomposing factor
tradeinto "endowment trade" and "induced trade", with the former due to the
country'sendowment of traded factors not being proportional to world endowments
oftraded factors, induced factor trade is positively correlated with the
relatively abundant nontraded factors used relatively intensively. Decomposing
goods trade into "preference trade" and "induced trade", with the former
reflecting taste differences, we derived a quantity version of the
Heckscher—Qhljntheorem: the induced net export of goods and induced factor
trade are positivelycorrelated with a country's relative abundance of the
nontradedfactors used relatively intensively. This result isagain very
general, allows for joint production, arbitrary differences between home and
foreign endowments, and requires no restriction on dimensionality. Assuming
nontraded factor price equalization, the theorem holds for relative intensities
defined by direct nontraded factor input coefficients. We also demonstrated—31—
thatin general induced goods trade and induced factor trade are substitutes,
and weestablished the precise sense in which this is so. The Travis—Vanek
theorem was extended to factor trade, under nontraded—factor price equalization.
The basic theorems of international trade, suitably interpreted,hold
with both goodstrade and factor trade. Inparticular, with at least as uany
distinct sectors as goods, the crucial dimensionality conditionunder which the
theorems hold intheir strong versions is thatthenumber of international
marketsfor goods and traded factors be at least aslarge as the total number of
factors.Hence, the crucial issue is not the relative number of goodsand
factorsper se but rather the number of markets.Of thecentral proposition,
onlythe price version of the Heckscher—Ohlin theorem fails to be essentially
preserved by this condition.—32—
Footnotes
*Thispaper waswrittenwhile lars Svensson was visiting NBER. We thank
NBER for providing secretarial assistance.
1. This point is stressed in Jones and Scheinknn (1977).
2. Earlier treatments of factor—price equalization and factor nxbility
may be found in Rodriguez (1975), Neary (1980), Svensson (1982), and
Ethier (1982b).
3. See Chang, Ethier and Kemp (1980) for a discussion of how joint
production affects the basictheoremsof international trade in goods.
1. We shall let subindices denote (the vector of) partial derivatives,
throughout. We disregard corner solutions.
5.Weassume that these functions exist and are differentiable. However
and r ——andtherefore x and z ——ynot be uniquely defined (for
example, if the technolo possesses constant returns to scale and there
are at least as i.ny goods as factors). We address this below when it
becomes relavant.
6.Thepurpose of the restriction Wdv =0isto prevent the endowment
changefrom disturbing deirands, at constant prices, by redistributing
incomes across countries. But this does not, in fact, limit the
applicabilityof our analysisbecause theoriginal position was itself
arbitrary except for the requirement that endowments be proportional.
Thus we could nake the initial international income distribution equal to
whatever we wish.—33—
7. From(i) we have = +— rk=G(pk(p,r2J,£)andhence
G&k =0since k(p,r,L) does not depend on k.
8.SeeWoodland (1977).
9.Welet J and J(y) denote both sets of sectors and the number of elements
of each set.
10. Equation (19) is in p, r, and w only. Hence, for constant p and r, w
does not depend on £.
11. This means that the set J(Y) remains unchanged.
12.See Woodland (1977) for properties of the unit value cost function.
13. For discussions of the new issues which nontraded goods introduce, and
of the changes they imply for standard propositions, see Ethier (1972),
Flam (1979),andWoodland (1982, Ch. 5).
hi.See Ethier (1982b) for a detailed discussion. The implications of joint
production are discussed in Chang, Ethier and Kemp (1980) and in
Woodland(1982).
15. See Ethier (1982b) for details.
16.Except, of course, where the validity of Rybczynski—type correlations
depends upon dimensionality, in which case condition (31) becomes
relevantas discussed above.
17. For marginal differences in factor endowments that fulfill (10), one can
derive the relations dx =Gdv =(Gk +G)dp. and dz dk —Icd2., which
pv pkL p £
are extensively discussed in Svensson (1982). There, traded and nontraded
factors are said tobe "cooperative" ("noncooperative") ifthe
correspondingelements of the matrix are positive (negative). Hence,_314_
tradedand nontraded factors being noncooperative corresponds, in the
present terminolor, to nontraded factors being relatively intensively
employedin the usage of traded factors.
18. See Kemp (19T6, Frt Two) and references cited therein.
19. An example saybefound in Svensson (1982).
20. Note that we are referring to the structure of commodity trade and not
to its aggregate size. The volume of goods trade say be either larger or
suRlier in the presence of factor trade than it would be without such
trade. This alternativenotion ofsubstitutability/complementarity is
analyzedin ?vrkusen (1983)and Svensson (1982).
21.See Vanek (1968).—35—
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